CBP Officers Used National Security Databases to Stalk Exes and Colleagues

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers used powerful government surveillance databases to stalk family members, former partners, and colleagues, according to internal records. These findings reveal a systemic pattern of personal misuse of tools designed for national security.

FOIA records spanning from 2009 to 2022 document nearly 300 incidents of database misuse by CBP workers. The scope of the abuse included agents using trusted-traveler application data to solicit dates and tracking the cellphones of coworkers via ad-tech-derived location data. Despite the sensitivity of these breaches, accountability remained inconsistent. Of the incidents tracked by Wired, 138 were referred to CBP management and 78 were assigned to criminal investigators, while 43 cases were classified as "Information Only" and were not investigated by the Office of Professional Responsibility.

The Surveillance Infrastructure

CBP manages one of the most expansive surveillance apparatuses in the world, integrating vast streams of data from border screenings, immigration arrests, and naturalization applications, alongside the SENTRI trusted-traveler program. To process this information, the agency relies on high-end technical infrastructure, including the DHS Mobile Fortify facial-recognition app and Palantir's ICM and FALCON systems. These tools provide agents with deep visibility into the movements and identities of millions of people, creating a centralized repository of private citizen data that is vulnerable to internal exploitation.

Systemic Oversight Failures

This misuse underscores a critical lack of oversight within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). When law-enforcement tools are repurposed for personal stalking or harassment, it demonstrates the inherent privacy risks of centralized, high-power databases. The fact that a significant portion of these incidents resulted in no formal investigation suggests that the agency's internal safeguards are insufficient to deter employees from exploiting their access for non-official purposes. This gap in accountability transforms a security tool into a weapon for personal vendettas.

Agency Response

In a statement to Wired, a CBP spokesperson asserted that the agency takes misconduct allegations seriously and works to "uphold the rule of law and hold ourselves accountable," adding that the agency takes "appropriate investigatory, corrective, and disciplinary action." However, the FOIA data suggests a stark gap between these stated policies and the actual enforcement of disciplinary measures. The lack of consistent punishment for those who weaponize government data suggests a culture of impunity. Observers will be watching to see if the DHS implements stricter auditing and access controls to prevent further abuses of its surveillance capabilities.